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Problems are raised with the global workspace hypothesis of consciousness, for
example about exactly how global the workspace needs to be for consciousness to
suddenly be present. Problems are also raised with Carruthers’s (2019) version that
excludes conceptual (categorical or discrete) representations, and in which phenomenal
consciousness can be reduced to physical processes, with instead a different levels
of explanation approach to the relation between the brain and the mind advocated.
A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described, in which there is a
particular computational system involved in which Higher Order Syntactic Thoughts
are used to perform credit assignment on first order thoughts of multiple step plans
to correct them by manipulating symbols in a syntactic type of working memory. This
provides a good evolutionary reason for the evolution of this kind of computational
module, with which, it is proposed, phenomenal consciousness is associated. Some
advantages of this HOST approach to phenomenal consciousness are then described
with reference not only to the global workspace approach, but also to Higher Order
Thought (HOT) theories. It is hypothesized that the HOST system which requires the
ability to manipulate first order symbols in working memory might utilize parts of the
prefrontal cortex implicated in working memory, and especially the left inferior frontal
gyrus, which is involved in language and probably syntactical processing. Overall, the
approach advocated is to identify the computations that are linked to consciousness,
and to analyze the neural bases of those computations.
Keywords: consciousness, higher order thought, levels of explanation, backward masking, syntax, global
workspace, attention, inattentional blindness
INTRODUCTION
A theory of phenomenal consciousness has recently been described that holds that this arises
when there is a global workspace with non-conceptual content (Carruthers, 2019). Non-conceptual
content refers to content that is about continuous representations, for example about exactly
how large an apple is, or just how red it is. The theory holds that phenomenal consciousness
can be reduced to a natural (physical or physically realized) property. Further, it is held that
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phenomenal consciousness can be associated with first order
thoughts, and does not require higher order thoughts (HOTs)
(thoughts about thoughts, including reflection). Carruthers
(2019) can identify no useful function performed by phenomenal
consciousness, and does not take a computational approach.
As a computational neuroscientist (Rolls, 2016), I find that it is
helpful in understanding brain and cognitive function to identify
the computations being performed by particular brain areas to
perform their functions. I therefore take here the computational
neuroscience approach, to identify what may be weaknesses in
and alternatives to the hypotheses described above (Carruthers,
2019), and then describe and develop further, a different,
higher order syntactic thought (HOST), theory of phenomenal
consciousness (Rolls, 2016). Phenomenal consciousness refers to
subjective feelings, about what it feels like to have a perception, or
an emotion, etc.
The first part of this paper includes a neuroscience assessment
of some of the key issues in the area of neuroscience around
which Carruthers builds his theory. It shows why I think that
alternatives to his approach, and to global workspace theories
in general (Dehaene, 2014), should be sought. This includes
a new consideration of levels of explanation in neuroscience,
and how causality may be assessed in relation to brain vs.
mental representations. An implication is that phenomena at
one level, such as phenomenal consciousness, cannot be reduced
to what co-occurs at a lower level, such as physical processes.
The second part of this paper outlines and develops further a
higher order syntactic thought (HOST) theory of consciousness,
which specifically identifies a kind of computation performed
by the brain that the theory holds is present when phenomenal
consciousness is reported. That goes beyond global workspace
theory, which specifies a lot of processing, but not the kind that
is important for consciousness. My HOST theory also identifies
important functions performed by those computations which go
beyond what is described in HOT approaches to consciousness.
Phenomenal consciousness refers to subjective feelings of
awareness, and the main criterion in humans for establishing
that it is present is reportability (Block, 2005; Rosenthal, 2005;
Carruthers, 2019).
THE GLOBAL WORKSPACE
HYPOTHESIS OF PHENOMENAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
It has been proposed that when information processing in the
brain becomes sufficiently widespread and involves sufficient
brain regions, then phenomenal consciousness occurs (Baars,
1988). Many studies have been performed that provide general
support for the approach, by showing that when phenomenal
consciousness is reported, cerebral processing is more extensive,
and often includes activity in the prefrontal cortex (Dehaene
et al., 2006, 2014, 2017; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene,
2014). Carruthers (2019) adheres to a global workspace approach
to phenomenal consciousness.
I propose that a major weakness of the global workspace
hypothesis is that it just proposes that when a certain amount
of global processing is reached, phenomenal consciousness
arises. That is, it does not identify the particular kind of
neural processing that is related to consciousness. In these
circumstances, the slope is very slippery. Exactly how much more
global must the processing be for it to mediate phenomenal
consciousness? If there is no yardstick that defines when enough
global processing is occurring for phenomenal consciousness to
be present, how can we use this to identify exactly what neural
processing is related to phenomenal consciousness?
To give an example, some people report being able to
do considerable processing, which seems to be rather global,
without reporting phenomenal consciousness and it feeling like
something, for example driving a car, for a short distance,
which must include extensive visual and motor processing. The
report may be that the person was conscious about something
entirely different, such as an ongoing discussion about the
nature of consciousness. Many examples that much can be
performed unconsciously, that is subliminally, are described by
Dehaene (2014) and in Section “Multiple Routes to Action.”
Another example shows further that even when language is being
used, that is not a sufficiently global level of processing for
phenomenal consciousness to be present. The example is from
Larry Weiskrantz, who investigated blindsight so interestingly
(Weiskrantz, 1986, 1997, 1998), who used to say to me every
morning in the Department of Experimental Psychology at the
University of Oxford “Edmund, how are you today,” and I would
reply “Fine, Larry.” Larry would then say: “Edmund, you have
no right to say that. You have not reflected on it.” Weiskrantz’s
point was that there is a kind (a type) of processing that may
be taking place when we are phenomenally conscious, and that
even being able to use language may not be a sufficient criterion
in terms of the level and amount of processing for phenomenal
consciousness to be present. I agree with Weiskrantz on this, and
that is why I find the global workspace hypothesis of phenomenal
consciousness to be too imprecise, with the amount of global
processing required not being defined in terms of any category,
but instead somewhere on a sliding scale. Weiskrantz’s views
about consciousness were that reflection, which is a kind of
information processing, is involved in consciousness. My own
view, set out below, is that it is a particular kind of processing that
underlies phenomenal consciousness, which is more precisely
defined than reflection but which is consistent with reflection,
namely the computations involved in higher order syntactic
thoughts (HOSTS).
Dehaene (2014) has a global workspace space theory of
consciousness that does not make as many claims about it
containing only non-conceptual content etc. as Carruthers
(2019). However, Dehaene’s approach deals mainly with access
consciousness (for example responding to stimuli, see Block,
2005), rather than very specifically addressing phenomenal
consciousness. Also, the exact computations that are involved
in (mainly access) consciousness are not make explicit beyond
something to do with long-range communication in the brain
(Dehaene et al., 2014). Dehaene (2014) writes (p 168): “I
believe that consciousness reduces to what the workspace does:
it makes relevant information globally accessible and flexibly
broadcasts it to a variety of brain systems.” Dehaene’s approach
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is though helpful in identifying some brain areas that seem to
be important in (mainly access) consciousness, including spread
to the global workspace to include areas such as the prefrontal
cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, area 10 of the anterior
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus.
Elsewhere (p. 108) Dehaene (2014) states that reasoning may
involve consciousness: “rationally thinking about a problem.”
That is starting to become close to HOST theory, in that at least
Dehaene has in mind something to do with serial thinking of the
type that might be implemented by a system capable of syntax,
which might be a set of first order thoughts attempting to solve
a problem. Further, he believes that neurons with large dendrites
in the prefrontal cortex may be useful for the global workspace
with the long-range connectivity needed, and even relates this
to language. He writes (p 173) that FoxP2, a gene specific to
humans, modulates our language networks, and generates very
large dendrites. Dehaene (2014) may be thinking beyond a
global workspace as being important in consciousness, toward
the kind of computation that brain systems implement when
consciousness is present. Addressing the type of computation
that is involved is a key approach taken in HOST theory [see
section “A Higher Order Syntactic Thought (HOST) Theory of
Phenomenal Consciousness”].
Shea and Frith (2019), like me, believe that global workspace
theories are inadequate, and that some type of metacognition
may be involved. In my Host theory [see section “A Higher
Order Syntactic Thought (HOST) Theory of Phenomenal
Consciousness”], I propose a particular type of metacognition
that is involved in phenomenal consciousness, and what the
advantages are of that type of metacognition.
For these reasons, I hold that current global workspace
theories are inadequate theories of phenomenal consciousness
(Rolls, 2011, 2012b, 2016), though they do help to make progress
with understanding at least access consciousness.
ATTENTION AND PHENOMENAL
CONSCIOUSNESS
Carruthers (2019) also considers what we learn about
consciousness from attentional phenomena. Apparently
contrary to global workspace hypotheses is research on attention
and phenomenal consciousness. For example, inattentional
blindness indicates that we only have phenomenal consciousness
for visual stimuli to which we are selectively paying attention
(Mack and Rock, 1998; Simons and Rensink, 2005), which is
when the workspace is not global, but focused by attention.
For example, if we pay attention to a baseball game, and are
told to watch the ball, we are not aware of a gorilla wandering
boldly across the scene (Simons and Chabris, 1999). This
can be accounted for by the well-understood mechanisms of
attention. In a complex spatial scene, the receptive fields of
inferior temporal cortex neurons decrease from approximately
70 degrees in diameter to a few degrees, about the size of a typical
object (Rolls et al., 2003; Aggelopoulos and Rolls, 2005). This can
be accounted for by local lateral inhibition decreasing the size of
inferior temporal cortex Gaussian receptive field profile neurons
(Trappenberg et al., 2002). That would mean that if fixating the
ball in the ball game, the inferior temporal cortex neurons would
not respond to the gorilla, who was not being fixated and was
several degrees from the fovea.
Top down attention can again influence what enters
phenomenal consciousness, but this is not surprising, for top–
down attentional mechanisms facilitate the representations of
objects to which we are paying attention by a top–down bias,
relative to other objects (Rolls and Deco, 2002; Deco and Rolls,
2004, 2005a,b; Rolls, 2016).
LEVELS OF EXPLANATION IN
NEUROSCIENCE, AND THE
IMPLICATION THAT PHENOMENA AT
ONE LEVEL, SUCH AS PHENOMENAL
CONSCIOUSNESS, CANNOT BE
REDUCED TO WHAT CO-OCCURS AT A
LOWER LEVEL, SUCH AS PHYSICAL
PROCESSES
We can now understand brain processing from the level of ion
channels in neurons, through neuronal biophysics, to neuronal
firing, through the computations performed by populations
of neurons, and how their activity is reflected by functional
neuroimaging, to behavioral and cognitive effects (Rolls, 2016).
Activity at any one level can be used to understand activity at
the next. This raises the philosophical issue of how we should
consider causality with these different levels (Rolls, 2016). Does
the brain cause effects in the mind, or do events at the mental,
mind, level influence brain activity?
What is the relation between the mind and the brain? This
is the mind-brain or mind-body problem. Do mental, mind,
events cause brain events? Do brain events cause mental effects?
What can we learn from the relation between software and
hardware in a computer about mind-brain interactions and how
causality operates? Neuroscience shows that there is a close
relation between mind and matter (captured by the following
inverted saying: ‘Never matter, no mind’).
Carruthers (2019) holds that phenomenal consciousness
can be reduced to a natural (physical or physically realized)
property. This, for him, takes much of the mystery out of
phenomenal consciousness, for it is just a matter of matter, and
simplifies his approach to all the questions raised by phenomenal
consciousness. But is it reasonable to argue that one can reduce
what is at a very high level in the processing system to the physical
properties that implement the processing at a lower level? I do
not think so. To make this point, we need to consider how
different levels of the system, such as the neuronal level and the
computational function being performed, relate to each other.
This is part of the very big problem of the relation between the
mind and the brain. Here is my approach to this.
One possible view that has been described (Rolls, 2016) is that
the relationship between mental events and neurophysiological
events is similar to the relationship between the program running
in a computer and the hardware of the computer. Does the
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program (the software loaded onto the computer usually written
in a high-level language such as C or Matlab) ‘cause’ the logic
gates (TTL, transistor-transistor logic) of the hardware to move
to the next state? And does this hardware state change ‘cause’
the program to move to its next step or state? Those interested
in the philosophy of the ‘mind-brain’ problem need to provide a
clear view on this computational issue in computers, as that is a
well-formulated problem.
I propose that one way to think about this is that when we
are looking at different levels of what is overall the operation
of a system, causality can usefully be understood as operating
within levels (causing one step of the program to move to the
next; or the neurons to move from one state to another), but not
between levels (e.g., software to hardware and vice versa). That is,
if the events at the different levels of explanation are occurring
simultaneously, without a time delay, then my view is that we
should not think of causality as operating between levels, but just
that what happens at a higher level may be an emergent property
of what happens at a lower level. This is the solution I propose to
this aspect of the mind-brain problem.
Following this thinking, when one step of a process at one level
of explanation moves to the next step in time, we can speak of
causality that would meet the criteria for Granger causality where
one time series, including the time series being considered, can
be used to predict the next step in time (Granger, 1969; Bressler
and Seth, 2011; Ge et al., 2012). In contrast, when we consider
the relationship between processes described at different levels of
explanation, such as the relation between a step in the hardware
in a computer and a step in the software, then these processes
may occur simultaneously, and be inextricably linked with each
other, and just be different ways of describing the same process, so
that temporal (Granger) causality does not apply to this relation
between levels, but only within levels. The whole processing can
now be specified from the mechanistic level of neuronal firings,
etc. up through the computational level to the cognitive and
behavioral level.
Sometimes the cognitive effects seem remarkable, for example
the recall of a whole memory from a part of it, and we
describe this as an ‘emergent property,’ but once understood
from the mechanistic level upwards, the functions implemented
are elegant and wonderful, but understandable and not magical
or poorly understood (Rolls, 2016). We can say here that
the way in which a discrete attractor network settles by its
collective computation into a low energy basin of attraction
to solve a computational problem is different in kind from a
set of individual neurons firing action potentials, or from the
transmitter being released onto each of the 10,000 synapses in
the typically 100,000 neurons in the cortical attractor network
(Rolls, 2016). In this sense, I do not think that a claim that all the
properties of the system, including its emergent properties, can
be reduced to what might be happening in noisy ion channels
in synapses. Of course, what is happening simultaneously at
different levels of the system is essential for its operation. But
what is happening at each level may be thought of as a different
kind. Computing invariant representations of objects, or recalling
memories from a small retrieval cue, can be thought of as
different kinds of operation (Rolls, 2016). In this situation, I am
not persuaded by Carruthers’s (2019) claim that all the properties
of the system at all levels can be reduced to operations at a low
level of physical processing. There appear to be differences in the
kinds of processing at different levels.
Now I argue below for my HOST theory of phenomenal
consciousness that at a very high level of the system, and only
in a particular part performing a particular kind of computation,
namely HOST processing, the top level of this system, another
emergent property may be phenomenal consciousness. It just
happens to be a property of this particular system, when it is
doing the kind of computation that I will describe, that it feels like
something. So I will argue that what is computed at high levels of
the system can be different in kind, and have different properties,
to what may be happening at a very low level of the system,
such as ion channels at synapses, or neuronal action potentials.
I therefore believe there is something different in kind about
phenomenal consciousness from neuronal firing or synaptic
transmitter release, and that makes my theory of phenomenal
consciousness very different to the theory of Carruthers (2019)
who reduced phenomenal consciousness to the level of physical
properties of the components that implement the computations.
Another point of importance is whether we can consider
that phenomenal consciousness has a function, that is, is causal.
Carruthers (2019) thinks that phenomenal consciousness is
causal, because we can detect it, by reporting whether at a
particular time we are phenomenally conscious of a particular
event. My view, which follows from my levels of explanation
approach just described, is that causality can best be considered
to operate within a level, rather than between levels. And I argue
that the HOST computations to which consciousness is related
do have very useful functions, which implies causal effects, as I
will describe. So I may wish to say the phenomenal consciousness
may have causal effects within its own level of processing; but
that what matters more practically is that the HOST-related
computations themselves have very useful functions in solving
credit assignment problems, and do this by operating within that
computational level, not at the level of subjective experience.
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS CAN
INCLUDE CONCEPTUAL AS WELL AS
NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT
In neuroscience, a fundamental distinction is made between
categorical or discrete, and continuous, representations (Rolls,
2016). Major examples of continuous representations are spatial
representations, which are inherently continuous. These are
frequently modeled by neurons with Gaussian receptive fields
that overlap partly with each other to cover the whole of the
space, and form a continuous attractor network (Rolls, 2016).
I agree with Carruthers (2019) that continuous representations,
of for example space, the magnitude of a sensory or reward-
related input, the exact color, etc. must be represented in
phenomenal consciousness.
However, I am puzzled by Carruthers’ (2019) failure to include
conceptual representations in phenomenal consciousness.
Conceptual representations are representations where there are
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distinct categories, such as a banana vs. an apple, a table vs. a
chair, or the face of one person vs. the face of another person.
Another example is provided by nouns, which frequently refer to
categories of object, such as the word ‘banana,’ or the word ‘apple.’
In neuroscience, we refer to these as discrete representations. My
view is that these discrete representations can also be included
in phenomenal consciousness. Take for example my mental
arithmetic about numbers, which are discrete representations.
If I perform mental arithmetic, performing some manipulation
of the numbers in a list such as placing them into reverse order,
or multiplying each number by 2 to the power of its position in
the list, being told that I have made an error somewhere, and
then thinking about what I did before, and trying to correct
it, then that is exactly the type of computation about discrete
representations that is represented in at least my phenomenal
consciousness. My HOST theory of consciousness applies to
conceptual as well as for non-conceptual representations, both
of which can benefit from the HOST type of computation, as
described below.
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS IS A
MATTER OF ‘KIND’
Carruthers argues that phenomenal consciousness is ‘all-or-none,’
either present, or not. I tend to agree with him. But that seems
somewhat inconsistent with a global workspace hypothesis, in
which when some sort of sliding threshold of a continuous
variable ‘globalness’ has been reached, consciousness is suddenly
present in an all or none way. My HOST theory proposes that the
unitary property of consciousness is related to its implementation
by a limited capacity syntactic processor that can only handle one
stream of processing at a time. The computational system thus
performs a particular kind of processing.
A HIGHER ORDER SYNTACTIC
THOUGHT (HOST) THEORY OF
PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS
This Section updates and summarizes my HOST theory of
consciousness (Rolls, 1997b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2016).
Multiple Routes to Action
A starting point is that many actions can be performed relatively
automatically, without apparent conscious intervention. An
example given above is driving a car for a short time if we are
thinking about something else. Another example is from the
areas of subliminal processing, for example the identification of
a visual stimulus that can occur without conscious awareness,
as shown by backward masking experiments (Rolls and
Tovee, 1994; Rolls et al., 1994b, 1999; Rolls, 2003). In
these psychophysical and neurophysiological studies, it was
found that face stimuli presented for 16 ms and followed
immediately by a masking stimulus were not consciously
perceived by humans, yet produced above chance identification,
and firing of inferior temporal cortex neurons in macaques
for approximately 30 ms. If the mask was delayed for
20 ms, the neurons fired for approximately 50 ms, and
the test face stimuli were more likely to be perceived
consciously (Rolls, 2003). This provides evidence that conscious
processing may have a higher threshold in sensory processing
than implicit processing that can lead to behavioral actions
(such as identifying the stimulus). Consistent with this
neurophysiology and the comparison with humans, neurons in
the human temporal lobe cortex also have larger responses to
stimuli on trials on which the human was aware of having
seen the stimulus (Quiroga et al., 2008). Further examples
of larger neural responses when stimuli are perceived are
described by Dehaene (2014).
It is suggested that part of the adaptive value of a higher
threshold for conscious awareness is that if conscious processing
is inherently serial and slow (because it may involve syntactic
operations in ways that we may be starting to understand (Rolls
and Deco, 2015), it may be maladaptive to interrupt it unless
there is a high probability that the interrupting signal does not
arise from noise in the system. Part in fact of my HOST theory
of consciousness (see Section “A Computational Hypothesis
of Phenomenal Consciousness” onwards) is that it provides a
computational reason why the threshold for information to reach
consciousness is higher than the threshold for information to
influence behavior in what is referred to as subliminal processing
(Dehaene et al., 2006).
Another example is much of the sensory processing and
actions that involve the dorsal stream of visual processing to
the parietal cortex, such as posting a letter through a letter box
at the correct orientation even when one may not be aware of
what the object is (Milner and Goodale, 1995; Milner, 2008;
Goodale, 2014). Another example is blindsight, in which humans
with damage to the visual cortex may be able to point to objects
even when they are not aware of seeing an object (Weiskrantz,
1997, 1998, 2009). Similar evidence applies to emotions, some of
the processing for which can occur without conscious awareness
(Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; LeDoux, 2008; Tamietto et al., 2009;
Brown et al., 2019). Consistent with the hypothesis of multiple
routes to action, only some of which involve conscious awareness,
is the evidence that split-brain patients may not be aware of
actions being performed by the ’non-dominant’ hemisphere
(Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978; Gazzaniga, 1988, 1995). Also
consistent with multiple, including non-verbal, routes to action,
patients with focal brain damage, for example to the prefrontal
cortex, may emit actions, yet comment verbally that they should
not be performing those actions (Rolls et al., 1994a; Hornak et al.,
2003). In both these types of patient, confabulation may occur,
in that a verbal account of why the action was performed may
be given, and this may not be related at all to the environmental
event that actually triggered the action.
Implicit (not phenomenally conscious) actions could involve
control of behavior by brain systems that are old in evolutionary
terms such as the basal ganglia. It is of interest that the basal
ganglia (and cerebellum) do not have backprojection systems
to most of the parts of the cerebral cortex from which they
receive inputs (Rolls, 2016). In contrast, parts of the brain such
as the hippocampus and amygdala, involved in functions such as
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episodic memory and emotion respectively, about which we can
make (verbal) declarations (hence declarative memory; Squire,
1992) do have major backprojection systems to the high parts of
the cerebral cortex from which they receive forward projections
(Rolls, 2016). I suggest that evolutionarily newer parts of the
brain, such as the language areas and parts of the prefrontal
cortex, are involved in an alternative type of control of behavior,
in which actions can be planned with the use of a (language)
system that allows relatively arbitrary (syntactic) manipulation of
semantic entities (symbols) (Rolls, 2016).
The general view that there are many routes to behavioral
output is supported by the evidence that there are many input
systems to the basal ganglia (from almost all areas of the cerebral
cortex), and that neuronal activity in each part of the striatum
reflects the activity in the overlying cortical area (Rolls, 2016).
The evidence is consistent with the possibility that different
cortical areas, each specialized for a different type of computation,
have their outputs directed to the basal ganglia, which then
select the strongest input, and map this into action (via outputs
directed, for example, to the premotor cortex). The view is also
supported by the evidence that the cingulate cortex is involved in
actions performed for goals (Rolls, 2019a). Within this scheme,
the language areas would offer one of many routes to action,
but a route particularly suited to planning actions, because of
the syntactic manipulation of semantic entities that may make
long-term planning possible.
It is accordingly possible that sometimes in normal humans
when actions are initiated as a result of processing in a
specialized brain region such as those involved in some types
of rewarded behavior, the language system may subsequently
elaborate a coherent account of why that action was performed
(i.e., confabulate). This would be consistent with a general view
of brain evolution in which, as areas of the neocortex evolve,
they are laid on top of existing circuitry connecting inputs to
outputs, and in which each level in this hierarchy of separate
input–output pathways may control behavior according to the
specialized function it can perform (Rolls, 2016) (see schematic
in Figure 1). (It is of interest that mathematicians may get a
hunch that something is correct, yet not be able to verbalize
why. They may then resort to formal, more serial and language-
like, theorems to prove the case, and these seem to require
conscious processing. This is a further indication of a close
association between linguistic processing, and consciousness. The
linguistic processing need not, as in reading, involve an inner
articulatory loop).
We may next examine some of the advantages and behavioral
functions that language, present as the most recently added layer
to the above system, would confer.
One major advantage would be the ability to plan actions
through many potential stages and to evaluate the consequences
of those actions without having to perform the actions. For this,
the ability to form propositional statements, and to perform
syntactic operations on the semantic representations of states in
the world, would be important.
Also important in this system would be the ability to
have second-order thoughts about the type of thought that
I have just described (e.g., I think that she thinks that...,
involving ‘theory of mind’), as this would allow much better
modeling and prediction of others’ behavior, and therefore
of planning, particularly planning when it involves others.
[Second-order thoughts are thoughts about thoughts. Higher-
order thoughts refer to second-order, third-order, etc., thoughts
about thoughts... (A thought may be defined briefly as an
intentional mental state, that is a mental state that is about
something. Thoughts include beliefs, and are usually described
as being propositional (Rosenthal, 2005). An example of a
thought is “It is raining.” A more detailed definition is as
follows. A thought may be defined as an occurrent mental
state (or event) that is intentional – that is a mental state
that is about something – and also propositional, so that
it is evaluable as true or false. Thoughts include occurrent
beliefs or judgments. Examples of thoughts are an occurrent
belief that the earth moves around the sun; and that it
never rains in southern California.)] This capability for higher-
order thoughts would also enable reflection on past events,
which would also be useful in planning. In contrast, non-
linguistic behavior would be driven by learned reinforcement
associations, learned rules etc., but not by flexible planning for
many steps ahead involving a model of the world including
others’ behavior. [The examples of behavior from non-humans
that may reflect planning may reflect much more limited and
inflexible planning. For example, the dance of the honey-
bee to signal to other bees the location of food may be
said to reflect planning, but the symbol manipulation is
not arbitrary. There are likely to be interesting examples
of non-human primate behavior that reflect the evolution
of an arbitrary symbol-manipulation system that could be
useful for flexible planning (Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990;
Whiten and Byrne, 1997)].
It is important to state that the language ability referred to
here is not necessarily human verbal language (though this would
be an example). What it is suggested is important to planning
is the syntactic manipulation of symbols, and it is this syntactic
manipulation of symbols that is the sense in which language is
defined and used here. The type of syntactic processing need
not be at the natural language level (which implies a universal
grammar), but could be at the level of mentalese (Fodor, 1994;
Rolls, 2016).
I understand reasoning, and rationality, to involve
syntactic manipulations of symbols in the way just described.
Reasoning thus typically may involve multiple steps of ‘if...
then’ conditional statements, all executed as a one-off or
one-time process (see below), and is very different from
associatively learned conditional rules typically learned over
many trials, such as ‘if yellow, a left choice is associated
with reward.’
A Computational Hypothesis of
Phenomenal Consciousness
Higher order thought (HOT) theory proposes that consciousness
may be the state that arises in a system that can think about
(or reflect on) its own (or other peoples’) thoughts, that
is in a system capable of second- or higher-order thoughts
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple routes to the initiation of actions and other behavioral responses in response to rewarding and punishing stimuli. The inputs from different
sensory systems to brain structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala allow these brain structures to evaluate the reward- or punishment-related value
of incoming stimuli, or of remembered stimuli. One type of route is via the language systems of the brain, which allow explicit (verbalizable) decisions involving
multistep syntactic planning to be implemented. The other type of route may be implicit, and includes the anterior cingulate cortex for action–outcome,
goal-dependent, learning; and the striatum and rest of the basal ganglia for stimulus–response habits. The basal ganglia may be involved in selecting only one
system for output. Outputs for autonomic responses can also be produced using outputs from the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (some of which
are routed via the anterior insular cortex) and amygdala.
(Rosenthal, 1986, 1990, 1993, 2004, 2005, 2012; Dennett, 1991;
Gennaro, 2004; Rolls, 2004, 2007a,b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012b,
2016; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011; Brown et al., 2019). On
this account, a mental state is non-introspectively (i.e., non-
reflectively) conscious if one has a roughly simultaneous thought
that one is in that mental state. Following from this, introspective
consciousness (or reflexive consciousness, or self consciousness)
is the attentive, deliberately focused consciousness of one’s mental
states. It is noted that not all of the higher-order thoughts need
themselves be conscious (many mental states are not). However,
according to the analysis, having a higher-order thought about a
lower-order thought is necessary for the lower-order thought to
be conscious (Rosenthal, 2005).
Rolls’ HOST theory of consciousness takes a more
computational approach, and argues that there is evolutionary
adaptive value in having a HOST computational mechanism that
can correct first (or lower) order multistep syntactic plans, in
which there is a credit assignment problem, as described below;
and proposes that phenomenal consciousness is a state that is
present when this computational module is engaged (Rolls, 2004,
2007a,b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2016, 2018). The symbols
being processed by this HOST system need to be grounded in
the world, as described below. This HOST theory of phenomenal
consciousness is described in the rest of Section “A Higher
Order Syntactic Thought (HOST) Theory of Phenomenal
Consciousness.”
The brain systems that are required for consciousness and
language are similar in at least some respects, I propose. In
particular, a system that can have second- or higher-order
thoughts about its own operation, including its planning and
linguistic operation, must itself be a language processor, in that
it must be able to bind correctly to the symbols and syntax in the
first-order system. According to this explanation, the feeling of
anything is the state that is present when a computational module
is engaged that can perform linguistic and in particular syntactic
processing that involves second- or higher-order thoughts about
lower order syntactic thoughts.
It might be objected that this hypothesis captures some of
the process aspects of consciousness, that is, what is useful in
an information processing system, but does not capture the
phenomenal aspect of consciousness. I agree that there is an
element of an emergent property that is invoked at this step
of the argument, when I say that it feels like something for a
computational module with higher-order syntactic thoughts to be
thinking about its own first- or lower-order syntactic thoughts.
But the elaboration of this point is the following: if a human
with second-order syntactic thoughts is thinking about her own
first-order syntactic thoughts, surely it is very difficult for us to
conceive that this would not feel like something? (Perhaps the
higher-order thoughts in thinking about the first-order thoughts
would need to have in doing this some sense of continuity or
self, so that the first-order thoughts would be related to the
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same system that had thought of something else a few minutes
ago. But even this continuity aspect may not be a requirement
for consciousness. Humans with anterograde amnesia cannot
remember what they felt a few minutes ago, yet their current state
does feel like something).
As a point of clarification, I note that according to my theory,
a language processing system [let alone a working memory
system as proposed by LeDoux (2008)] is not sufficient for
consciousness. What defines a conscious system according to this
analysis is the ability to have higher-order syntactic thoughts,
and a first order language processor (that might be perfectly
competent at language) would not be conscious, in that it
could not think about its own or others’ thoughts. One can
perfectly well conceive of a system that obeyed the rules of
language (which is the aim of some connectionist modeling),
and implemented a first-order linguistic system, that would
not be conscious. [Possible examples of language processing
that might be performed non-consciously include computer
programs implementing aspects of language, or ritualized human
conversations, e.g., about the weather. These might require syntax
and correctly grounded semantics, and yet be performed non-
consciously. A more complex example, illustrating that syntax
could be used, might be “If A does X, then B will probably do Y,
and then C would be able to do Z.” A first order language system
could process this statement. Moreover, the first order language
system could apply the rule usefully in the world, provided that
the symbols in the language system (A, B, X, Y etc.) are grounded
(have meaning) in the world].
A second clarification is that the plan would have to be a
unique string of steps, in much the same way as a sentence can
be a unique and one-off (or one-time) string of words. The point
here is that it is helpful to be able to think about particular one-
off plans, and to correct them; and that this type of operation is
very different from the slow learning of fixed rules by trial and
error, or the application of fixed rules by a supervisory part of a
computer program.
Adaptive Value of the Computational
Processing That Is Related to
Phenomenal Consciousness
It is suggested that part of the evolutionary adaptive significance
of this type of higher-order syntactic thought computational
system is that it enables correction of errors made in first-
order linguistic or in non-linguistic processing. Indeed, the
ability to reflect on previous events is extremely important for
learning from them, including setting up new long-term semantic
structures. There is evidence that the hippocampus is a system
for such ‘declarative’ recall of recent memories (Squire and Zola,
1996; Kesner and Rolls, 2015; Rolls, 2016). Its close relation to
‘conscious’ processing in humans (Squire has classified it as a
declarative memory system) may be simply that it enables the
recall of recent memories, which can then be reflected upon in
conscious, higher-order, processing. Another part of the adaptive
value of a higher-order thought system may be that by thinking
about its own thoughts in a given situation, it may be able to
understand better the thoughts of another individual in a similar
situation, and therefore predict that individual’s behavior better
(Humphrey, 1986).
In line with the argument on the adaptive value of higher-
order thoughts and thus consciousness given above, that they are
useful for correcting lower-order thoughts, I now suggest that
correction using higher-order thoughts of lower-order thoughts
would have adaptive value primarily if the lower-order thoughts
are sufficiently complex to benefit from correction in this way.
The nature of the complexity is specific – that it should involve
syntactic manipulation of symbols, probably with several steps
in the chain, and that the chain of steps should be a one-off
(or in American usage, ‘one-time,’ meaning used once) set of
steps, as in a sentence or in a particular plan used just once,
rather than a set of well learned rules. The first or lower-order
thoughts might involve a linked chain of ‘if... then’ statements
that would be involved in planning, an example of which has
been given above, and this type of cognitive processing is thought
to be a primary basis for human skilled performance. It is partly
because complex lower-order thoughts such as these that involve
syntax and language would benefit from correction by higher-
order thoughts that I suggest that there is a close link between
this reflective consciousness and language.
The computational hypothesis is that by thinking about
lower-order thoughts, the higher-order thoughts can discover
what may be weak links in the chain of reasoning at the lower-
order level, and having detected the weak link, might alter the
plan, to see if this gives better success. In our example above, if it
transpired that C could not do Z, how might the plan have failed?
Instead of having to go through endless random changes to the
plan to see if by trial and error some combination does happen
to produce results, what I am suggesting is that by thinking about
the previous plan, one might, for example, using knowledge of
the situation and the probabilities that operate in it, guess that
the step where the plan failed was that B did not in fact do Y. So
by thinking about the plan (the first- or lower-order thought), one
might correct the original plan in such a way that the weak link
in that chain, that ‘B will probably do Y,’ is circumvented.
To draw a parallel with neural networks: there is a credit
assignment problem in such multistep syntactic plans, in that
if the whole plan fails, how does the system assign credit or
blame to particular steps of the plan? [In multilayer neural
networks, the credit assignment problem is that if errors are
being specified at the output layer, the problem arises about
how to propagate back the error to earlier, hidden, layers of
the network to assign credit or blame to individual synaptic
connections (Rumelhart et al., 1986; Rolls, 2016).] My hypothesis
is that this solution to the credit assignment problem for a
one-off syntactic plan is the function of higher-order syntactic
thoughts, and is why computational systems with higher-order
syntactic thoughts evolved. The suggestion I then make is that
if a system were doing this type of processing (thinking about
its own thoughts), it would then be very plausible that it should
feel like something to be doing this. I even suggest to the reader
that it is not plausible to suggest that it would not feel like
anything to a system if it were doing this.
I emphasize that the plan would have to be a unique string
of steps, in much the same way as a sentence can be a unique
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and one-off string of words. The point here is that it is helpful
to be able to think about particular one-off plans, and to correct
them; and that this type of operation is very different from the
slow learning of fixed rules by trial and error, or the application
of fixed rules by a supervisory part of a computer program.
Symbol Grounding
A further point in the argument should be emphasized for clarity.
The system that is having syntactic thoughts about its own
syntactic thoughts (higher-order syntactic thoughts or HOSTs)
would have to have its symbols grounded in the real world for
it to feel like something to be having higher-order thoughts.
The intention of this clarification is to exclude systems such
as a computer running a program when there is in addition
some sort of control or even overseeing program checking the
operation of the first program. We would want to say that in
such a situation it would feel like something to be running the
higher level control program only if the first-order program was
symbolically performing operations on the world and receiving
input about the results of those operations, and if the higher-
order system understood what the first order system was trying
to do in the world.
The symbols (or symbolic representations) are symbols in
the sense that they can take part in syntactic processing. The
symbolic representations are grounded in the world in that they
refer to events in the world. The symbolic representations must
have a great deal of information about what is referred to in
the world, including the quality and intensity of sensory events,
emotional states, etc. The need for this is that the reasoning in the
symbolic system must be about stimuli, events, and states, and
remembered stimuli, events and states, and for the reasoning to
be correct, all the information that can affect the reasoning must
be represented in the symbolic system, including for example
just how light or strong the touch was, etc. Indeed, it is pointed
out (Rolls, 2014a) that it is no accident that the shape of the
multidimensional phenomenal (sensory etc.) space does map so
clearly onto the space defined by neuronal activity in sensory
systems, for if this were not the case, reasoning about the state of
affairs in the world would not map onto the world, and would not
be useful. Good examples of this close correspondence are found
in the taste system, in which subjective space maps simply onto
the multidimensional space represented by neuronal firing in
primate cortical taste areas (Kadohisa et al., 2005). In particular,
if a two-dimensional space reflecting the distances between the
representations of different tastes provided by macaque neurons
in the cortical taste areas is constructed, then the distances
between the subjective ratings by humans of different tastes is
very similar (Kadohisa et al., 2005; Rolls, 2014b). Similarly, the
changes in human subjective ratings of the pleasantness of the
taste, smell and sight of food parallel very closely the responses of
neurons in the macaque orbitofrontal cortex (Rolls, 2014a).
The representations in the first-order linguistic processor
that the HOSTs process include beliefs (for example “Food is
available,” or at least representations of this), and the HOST
system would then have available to it the concept of a thought
(so that it could represent “I believe [or there is a belief]
that food is available”). However, as argued by Rolls (2014a),
representations of sensory processes and emotional states must
be processed by the first-order linguistic system, and HOSTs
may be about these representations of sensory processes and
emotional states capable of taking part in the syntactic operations
of the first-order linguistic processor. Such sensory and emotional
information may reach the first-order linguistic system from
many parts of the brain, including those such as the orbitofrontal
cortex and amygdala implicated in emotional states. When
the sensory information is about the identity of the taste, the
inputs to the first-order linguistic system must come from the
primary taste cortex, in that the identity and intensity of taste,
independently of its pleasantness (in that the representation is
independent of hunger) must come from the primary taste cortex.
In contrast, when the information that reaches the first-order
linguistic system is about the pleasantness of taste, it must come
from the secondary taste (orbitofrontal) cortex, in that there
the representation of taste depends on hunger and is linearly
related to pleasantness (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2008; Rolls and
Grabenhorst, 2008; Rolls, 2014a).
The main answer that I propose now to the issue of symbol
grounding is as follows, with more details available (Rolls, 2016).
The gene-specified rewards or goals for action that are the bases
for emotional and motivational states play the role for these states
of grounding them in the world. The organism has to be built
to want food rewards, to avoid pain, etc. I propose that this
grounding for gene-specified emotional and motivational states
provides the basis for the symbol grounding in the symbolic
system, in that what the symbolic system computes, in a sense
its goals, must be close to what the gene-specified emotional and
motivational systems are grounded in, as otherwise the symbolic
reasoning system and the gene goal-based emotional system
would be inconsistent, and the reasoning system would not have
adaptive value in evolution. To put this another way, unless the
symbolic syntactic reasoning system had the belief that the gene-
specified goals of the emotional system were among the goals
of the reasoning system, then the two systems together could
not produce consistent actions in general, and that would be
unadaptive in the evolutionary sense. That leaves it open then
in evolution for the symbolic system to add reasoned goals of
its own, which might be for the advantage of the individual, but
would still be in the same design framework of the emotion- and
motivation-related goals specified by genes (Rolls, 2014a, 2018).
Qualia: Phenomenal Aspects of
Consciousness
This analysis does not yet give an account for sensory qualia
(raw sensory feels, for example why ‘red’ feels red), for emotional
qualia (e.g., why a rewarding touch produces an emotional
feeling of pleasure), or for motivational qualia (e.g., why food
deprivation makes us feel hungry). The view I suggest on such
qualia is as follows.
Information processing in and from our sensory systems (e.g.,
the sight of the color red) may be relevant to planning actions
using language and the conscious processing thereby implied.
Given that these inputs must be represented in the system that
plans, we may ask whether it is more likely that we would
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be conscious of them or that we would not. I suggest that it
would be a very special-purpose system that would allow such
sensory inputs, and emotional and motivational states, to be part
of (linguistically based) planning, and yet remain unconscious
(given that the processing being performed by this system is
inherently conscious, as suggested above). It seems to be much
more parsimonious to hold that we would be conscious of
such sensory, emotional, and motivational qualia because they
would be being used (or are available to be used) in this type
of (linguistically based) higher-order thought processing system,
and this is what I propose.
The explanation of emotional and motivational subjective
feelings or qualia that this discussion has led toward is thus
that they should be felt as conscious because they enter into a
specialized linguistic symbol-manipulation system, which is part
of a higher-order thought system that is capable of reflecting on
and correcting its lower-order thoughts involved for example in
the flexible planning of actions. It would require a very special
machine to enable this higher-order linguistically-based thought
processing, which is conscious by its nature, to occur without the
sensory, emotional and motivational states (which must be taken
into account by the higher-order thought system) becoming felt
qualia. The sensory, emotional, and motivational qualia are thus
accounted for by the evolution of a linguistic (i.e., syntactic)
system that can reflect on and correct its own lower-order
processes, and thus has adaptive value. Reasons why the ventral
visual system is more closely related to explicit (conscious)
than implicit processing include the fact that representations
of objects and individuals need to enter the planning, hence
conscious, system, and are considered in more detail elsewhere
(Rolls, 2003, 2016).
This account implies that it may be especially animals with
a higher-order belief and thought system and with linguistic
(i.e., syntactic, not necessarily verbal) symbol manipulation
that have qualia. It may be that much non-human animal
behavior, provided that it does not require flexible linguistic
planning and correction by reflection, could take place
according to reinforcement-guidance (using, e.g., stimulus-
reinforcer association learning in the amygdala and orbitofrontal
cortex (Rolls, 2014a, 2019b), and rule-following [implemented,
e.g., using habit or stimulus-response learning in the basal
ganglia]). Such behaviors might appear very similar to human
behavior performed in similar circumstances, but need not
imply qualia. It would be primarily by virtue of a system for
reflecting on flexible, linguistic, planning behavior that humans
(and animals close to humans, with demonstrable syntactic
manipulation of symbols, and the ability to think about these
linguistic processes) would be different from other animals, and
would have evolved qualia.
It is of interest to comment on how the evolution of
a system for flexible planning might affect emotions (Rolls,
2018). Consider grief which may occur when a reward is
terminated and no immediate action is possible. It may be
adaptive by leading to a cessation of the formerly rewarded
behavior and thus facilitating the possible identification of other
positive reinforcers in the environment. In humans, grief may
be particularly potent because it becomes represented in a
system which can plan ahead, and understand the enduring
implications of the loss. Thus depression in humans may
be much more severe than in animals without a reasoning
system, because the explicit, reasoning, system can see how
bad the non-reward or punisher really is, can foresee the
consequences for the future using reasoning, and using re-
entrant processing between the explicit and implicit systems
may produce positive feedback as a result of rumination (Rolls,
2018). In this situation, thinking about or verbally discussing
emotional states may help, because this can lead toward the
identification of new or alternative reinforcers, and of the
realization that for example negative consequences may not be
as bad as feared.
How Might HOST Processing Be
Implemented in the Brain?
A key requirement of the implementation of HOST processing
is that it needs to allow manipulation of items in some type
of short-term memory store, so that for example several steps
in a plan can be evaluated, and rearranged, or corrected.
Now much of the neurophysiology of short-term memory
has been on how individual items can be stored and later
recalled (Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Rao et al., 1997; Miller and
Cohen, 2001; Miller, 2013; Lundqvist et al., 2018), utilizing
continuing firing in attractor networks for both single items
and multiple items (Deco and Rolls, 2003, 2005a; Deco et al.,
2010; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Martinez-Garcia et al., 2011; Rolls
et al., 2013; Rolls, 2016). A key brain area for such short
term memory systems is the prefrontal cortex (Passingham and
Wise, 2012). An ordered temporal sequence of items can also
be encoded in some brain systems such as the hippocampus
(Eichenbaum, 2014, 2017; Howard and Eichenbaum, 2015),
by taking advantage of neurophysiological processes such as
synaptic or neuronal temporal adaptation to provide a basis for
a temporal order mechanism (Deco and Rolls, 2005c; Rolls and
Mills, 2019).
However, psychologists have long distinguished between
short-term memory and working memory, with the latter
having the property that items in the working memory can
be manipulated, for example rearranged into a different order
(Baddeley, 2007, 2012; Baddeley et al., 2019). Given that I see
the HOST system as having usefulness for correcting and re-
arranging, in fact manipulating, items that might be multiple
steps of a plan, working memory may be a component required
for HOST computations. The prefrontal cortex is implicated
in working memory (Passingham and Wise, 2012), and that
points toward the prefrontal cortex as a candidate region for at
least some role in HOST computations. Moreover, investigations
of which brain regions may become involved when processing
becomes sufficiently global when phenomenal consciousness
is present include working memory-related regions of the
prefrontal cortex (Dehaene, 2014).
Now the manipulation of items (which are likely to be
symbols) in a HOST system requires at least some syntax, for
different symbols may appear in different steps of a multiple
step plan, and some symbols may be in several steps. Now if
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we consider which parts of the prefrontal cortex may be related
to symbol manipulation in humans, the left inferior frontal
gyrus, Broca’s area, BA45 and BA44 is the most obvious region.
Indeed, it may be involved in syntactical processing in humans,
with perhaps the role of ordering words to produce a stream
of words with the items in the stream ordered grammatically
correctly (Amunts and Zilles, 2012). Moreover, the human left
inferior frontal gyrus has major connectivity with the temporal
lobe areas implicated in semantic memory (Kelly et al., 2010;
Petrides, 2014; Du et al., 2020), and it may be from these
temporal lobe areas that the semantics is obtained that may be
woven into a syntactic stream by the left inferior frontal gyrus.
The connectivity of the human left inferior frontal gyrus with
the angular and supramarginal gyri (Petrides, 2014; Du et al.,
2020) also provides evidence that the human inferior frontal
gyrus plays a key role in linguistic processing, which at least
requires syntax.
How syntactical operations, necessary for HOST processing,
but not necessarily at the level of human linguistic processing,
are implemented in the brain remains a major challenge
for neuroscience (Rolls, 2016). One proposal, consistent with
much of what we know about connected cortical attractor
networks, is that syntax is implemented by a trajectory through
a state space in one direction because of stronger forward
than backward connections between cortical modules, with
each module specialized for a different syntactical role, such
as subject or verb or object (Rolls and Deco, 2015; Rolls,
2016). Each such cortical module is a small cortical region
approximately 2–3 mm in diameter in which there is a
reasonably high probability (0.1) of connections between the
neurons, so that an attractor network can be implemented.
Each such neocortical module has in the order of 10,000
connections onto every pyramidal neuron devoted to these
local recurrent collateral connections, and an attractor network
of this type has a capacity of in the order of 10,000 items
(e.g., nouns, or verbs) (given somewhat sparse representations),
as has been proved with the tools of theoretical physics
(Amit, 1989; Treves, 1991; Treves and Rolls, 1991) and
confirmed by simulation (Rolls et al., 1997; Rolls, 2012a,
2016). This is of considerable interest, for any one such
small cortical module has the capacity to store, and produce
when cued, in the order of 10,000 items, which is in
the order of the number of words in a typical vocabulary
(Rolls and Deco, 2015). This approach has been developed
as far as a working computational model using biologically
plausible integrate-and-fire neuronal networks of how syntax
might be implemented in the brain (Rolls and Deco, 2015).
However, a limitation is that this approach has not yet been
developed beyond simple sentences with a subject, verb, and
object, using temporal order as a way in which the syntax
is encoded by the sender, and decoded by the receiver
(Rolls and Deco, 2015).
This is thus one possible way to think about how the syntax
required for HOST processing might be implemented in the
brain; but research on computational mechanisms for syntax in
the brain is at an early stage; and the left inferior frontal gyrus
might be one of a number of connected cortical areas that play
a role in the syntactic processing required for HOSTs in humans
(Rolls, 2021).
Conscious Free Will
Our brains operate non-deterministically, and in that sense
we might be said to be free (Rolls, 2010, 2016; Rolls and
Deco, 2010). The non-deterministic computations performed
by the brain are due to the almost random spike times for
a given mean firing rate: the spike times have an almost
Poisson distribution, apart from the refractory period, during
the normal operation of the cerebral cortex during waking
(Rolls, 2016). This stochasticity arises from the fact that the
membrane potential is held close to the threshold of firing, so
that if some extra synaptic input arrives at a neuron, it can
fire spikes very soon, without having to wait for the membrane
potential with its 20 ms time constant to be driven up toward
the threshold of firing (Rolls, 2016); and there is always a
little noise in the system, arising for example from ion channel
noise (Faisal et al., 2008). This stochasticity results in decision-
making being probabilistic if the odds are close to even. This
stochasticity also results in jumps in memory systems in the
brain, from one representation to another, allowing a certain
stochasticity in thought processes (Rolls and Deco, 2010; Rolls,
2016). Although the noise is random, the jumps are not random,
but the probability of their direction in the high dimensional
space of stored associative memories, for example semantic
memories, depends on the strength of the connections between
the nodes. In a semantic memory, a jump might be from one
idea to a somewhat related idea. I have argued that this is a
key feature of human creativity, and the fact that the jumps
are not in random directions helps us to discover new ideas
around a particular theme, instead of just filling our minds
with random sets of ideas. After a jump in such an associative
memory, it is up to the reasoning (rational) system to evaluate
whether the new idea is useful, or whether to abandon it and
keep thinking. All of this has been worked out in detail with
the concepts of theoretical physics and with integrate-and-fire
neuronal network simulations (Deco et al., 2009; Rolls, 2010,
2016; Rolls and Deco, 2010). Creativity has even been linked
to the variability of functional connectivity, which is produced
by these mechanisms (Sun et al., 2019). The point in relation
to free will is that, unlike most computers, we do not perform
fully deterministic computations, and in that sense have some
freedom of thought, and of the decisions that are taken, by this
combination of stochasticity and rational evaluation of the results
of the stochasticity.
In Section “Multiple Routes to Action” on multiple routes
to action, it was argued that one type of route is implicit,
that is unconscious, and accounts for much of our behavior.
All of the evidence from subliminal processing (i.e., without
consciousness), and inattentional blindness, attests to this
(Dehaene, 2014; Dehaene et al., 2014), as does work on split-brain
patients (Gazzaniga and LeDoux, 1978). The explicit, reasoning,
system may confabulate explanations about why such implicit
actions were performed. But when the reasoning (explicit,
rational) system, using syntactic manipulation of symbols, is
being used, then the reasoning for the decision that is given
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may be a true reflection of the computations being performed.
Further, such decisions can be in the interests of the individual
person, or could be perfectly altruistic, whereas decisions taken
by the implicit system will generally be in the interests of
the genotype, with the arguments elaborated elsewhere (Rolls,
2014a, 2016, 2018). The point I make here though is that if
we wish to use the term free will, then it could be applied
to the rational system, in which decisions can be conscious,
as described here.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER THEORIES
OF CONSCIOUSNESS
Global Workspace Theories of
Consciousness
My HOST theory of phenomenal consciousness described here
hypothesizes that the information must be being processed
in a computational system capable of implementing HOSTs
for the information to be phenomenally conscious, and is
in this sense more specific than global workspace hypotheses
(Baars, 1988; Cole et al., 2014; Dehaene et al., 2014, 2017;
Carruthers, 2019). I suggest that a workspace could be sufficiently
global for the complex processing involved in for example
driving a car, and yet the processing might be performed
unconsciously, unless there was activity about the driving in
the HOST (supervisory, monitory, correcting) system. A key
weakness of global workspace theories of consciousness is
that there is no precise way of prescribing just what level
of globalness is needed for what is considered to be the
all-or-none kind of phenomenal consciousness to be present.
HOST theory in contrast holds that there is a particular kind
of computation that is needed for phenomenal consciousness
to be present, and so can make precise predictions about
the brain mechanisms related to consciousness. However,
research taking the approach of a global workspace is
very helpful in providing evidence on which brain regions
become particularly involved when phenomenal consciousness
is present (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Dehaene, 2014;
Dehaene et al., 2014, 2017).
A number of issues have been raised above about Carruthers’s
(2019) version of global workspace theory. One is that conceptual
as well as non-conceptual content can be present on phenomenal
conscious. Another is that, given the levels of explanation points
made in Section “Attention and Phenomenal Consciousness,”
I do not hold the view that phenomenal consciousness can
be reduced to physical properties, although as was made
clear, the physical processes at a lower level than that of
phenomenal consciousness must take place for phenomenal
consciousness to arise as an emergent property. Carruthers
also does not specify any utility for phenomenal consciousness,
whereas I have argued in Section “Adaptive Value of the
Computational Processing That Is Related to Phenomenal
Consciousness” that the HOST-related computation that is
associated with phenomenal consciousness is computationally
very useful, as it is part of the way in which credit
assignment problems for errors in multistep syntactic processing
can be corrected.
Higher Order Thought (HOT) Theories
Higher order thought theories of phenomenal consciousness hold
that a HOT is needed to make a first order thought conscious
(Rosenthal, 1990, 2004, 2005, 2012; Carruthers, 2000; Gennaro,
2004; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011). LeDoux has moved away
from his former working memory approach to consciousness
(LeDoux, 2008) toward the HOT theory of consciousness with
colleagues (Brown et al., 2019). Some ways in which my HOST
theory is different from other HOT theories is that it provides
a computational account of the evolutionary, adaptive, value
of a higher-order syntactic thought system. I propose that the
HOST system has the capability to solve the credit assignment
problem that arises in a multistep syntactic plan, and links this
type of computation to phenomenal consciousness, and therefore
emphasizes a role for syntactic processing in consciousness. The
type of syntactic processing implemented in the HOST system
need not be at the natural language level (which implies a
universal grammar), but could be at the level of mentalese, or
simpler, as it involves primarily the syntactic manipulation of
symbols and not necessarily the production of speech (Fodor,
1994; Rolls, 2016).
My theory holds that it is higher-order syntactic thoughts,
HOSTs (Rolls, 1997a,b, 2004, 2007a,b, 2008, 2012b, 2016, 2018)
that are closely associated with consciousness, and may differ
from Rosenthal’s higher-order thought (HOT) theory (Rosenthal,
1990, 2004, 2005, 2012; Lau and Rosenthal, 2011) in the emphasis
in my theory of the syntactic manipulation of symbols, which
is useful for example in thinking through and comparing plans,
and in credit assignment. The computational module suggested
includes a type of working memory with these capabilities.
The reason that syntax is emphasized is that it is as a result
of having a multistep, flexible, ‘one-off’, reasoning procedure that
errors can be corrected by using ‘thoughts about thoughts’. This
enables correction of errors that cannot be easily corrected by
reward or punishment received at the end of the reasoning, due
to the credit assignment problem. That is, there is a need for
some type of supervisory and monitoring process, to detect where
errors in the multi-step reasoning have occurred. According
to HOST theory, phenomenal consciousness about information
arises when the HOST computational brain system becomes
engaged in processing that information. The nature of the
representation of information in the brain is described inCerebral
Cortex; Principles of Operation (Rolls, 2016).
This suggestion on the adaptive value in evolution of such a
higher-order linguistic thought process for multistep planning
ahead, and correcting such plans, may also be different from
earlier work. The computational point is that credit assignment
when reward or punishment is received is straightforward in
a one-layer network (in which the reinforcement can be used
directly to correct nodes in error, or responses) [see Appendix
2 of Rolls (2016)], but is very difficult in a multistep linguistic
process executed once. Very complex mappings in a multilayer
network can be learned but only with hundreds of training
trials, and with an explicit teaching signal (LeCun et al., 2015;
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Rolls, 2016). But once these complex mappings are learned, their
success or failure in a new situation on a given trial cannot be
evaluated and corrected by the network. Indeed, the complex
mappings achieved by such networks (e.g., networks trained
by backpropagation of errors or by reinforcement learning)
mean that after training they operate according to fixed rules,
and are often quite impenetrable, inflexible, and difficult to
correct quickly (Rumelhart et al., 1986; Rolls, 2016; Plebe and
Grasso, 2019). In contrast, to correct a multistep, single occasion,
syntactically based plan, recall of the steps just made in the
reasoning or planning, and perhaps of related episodic material,
needs to occur, so that the step in the chain of reasoning that is
most likely to be in error can be identified. This may be part of
the reason why there is a close relationship between declarative
memory systems, which can explicitly recall memories, so that the
steps in a plan can for example be corrected, and consciousness.
Some computer programs may have supervisory processes.
Should these count as higher-order linguistic thought processes?
I do not think that they should, to the extent that they
operate with fixed rules to correct the operation of a system
that does not involve one-off syntactic thoughts about symbols
grounded semantically in the external world. On the other hand,
if it was possible to implement on a computer such a high-
order syntactic thought-supervisory process to correct first-order
one-off syntactic thoughts with symbols grounded in the real
world, then prima facie I would argue that this process would
be conscious. If it were possible in a thought experiment to
reproduce the neural connectivity and computations performed
by a human brain on a computer, then prima facie it would
also have the attributes of consciousness. This is a functionalist
position. Such a computer might continue to have those attributes
for as long as power was applied to the system. Another possible
difference from earlier theories is that raw sensory feels are
suggested to arise when sensory information is being processed
by this computational system that can think about its own
thoughts. Raw sensory feels, and subjective states associated with
emotional and motivational states, may not necessarily arise
first in evolution.
A property often attributed to consciousness is that it is
unitary. My HOST theory accounts for this by the limited
syntactic capability of neuronal networks in the brain, which
render it difficult to implement more than a few syntactic
bindings of symbols simultaneously, and where the items being
processed occur in a single serial processing stream (Rolls
and Deco, 2015; Rolls, 2016). Such a stream might involve
a serial trajectory through a linked set of attractor network
nodes each of which is specialized for a different component
of syntax (Rolls and Deco, 2015; Rolls, 2016). This limitation
makes it difficult to run several ‘streams of consciousness’
simultaneously. In addition, given that a linguistic system can
control behavioral output, several parallel streams might produce
maladaptive behavior (apparent as, e.g., indecision, or attempting
to perform incompatible responses simultaneously), and might
be selected against. The close relationship between, and the
limited capacity of, both the stream of consciousness, and a
type of auditory-verbal short-term working memory, may be
that both implement the capacity for syntax in neural networks.
The difficulty of implementing syntactic binding in neuronal
networks (Rolls and Deco, 2015; Rolls, 2016) may well place
limitations on consciousness that lead to some of its properties,
such as its unitary nature.
The HOST theory holds that consciousness arises by virtue
of a computational system that can think syntactically about its
own syntactic thoughts. The advantages for a system of being
able to do this have been described, and this has been suggested
as the reason why consciousness evolved. The evidence that
consciousness arises by virtue of having a computational system
that can perform higher-order syntactic processing is however,
and I think may remain, circumstantial. (Why does it feel like
something when we are performing a certain type of information
processing? A plausibility argument may help: can one think
of oneself thinking about, manipulating, and correcting one’s
own multistep plans and thoughts that are grounded in the
world without it feeling like something when such a computation
is taking place?) The evidence, summarized above, includes
the points that we think of ourselves as conscious when, for
example, we recall earlier events, compare them with current
events, and plan many steps ahead. Evidence also comes from
neurological cases, from, for example, split-brain patients (who
may confabulate conscious stories about what is happening in
their other, non-language, hemisphere) (Gazzaniga and LeDoux,
1978); and from cases such as frontal lobe patients who can tell
one consciously what they should be doing, but nevertheless may
be doing the opposite (Rolls et al., 1994a; Rolls, 2014a). (The force
of this type of case is that much of our behavior may normally be
produced by routes about which we cannot verbalize, and about
which we are not conscious).
This raises discussion of the causal role of consciousness. Does
consciousness cause our behavior? The view that I currently
hold is that the computation and information processing that is
related to consciousness (activity in a linguistic system capable
of higher-order thoughts, and used for planning and correcting
the operation of lower-order linguistic systems) can play a causal
role in producing our behavior (see Figure 1). The framework
is what is described in the ‘levels of explanation’ account of
the relation between mental events and brain events in Section
“Levels of Explanation in Neuroscience, and the Implication That
Phenomena at One Level, Such as Phenomenal Consciousness,
Cannot be Reduced to What Co-occurs at a Lower Level, Such as
Physical Processes.”
Monitoring, Confidence, and
Consciousness
Attractor networks in the cerebral cortex with positive feedback
implemented by excitatory recurrent collateral connections
between the neurons can implement decision-making (Wang,
2002, 2008; Deco and Rolls, 2006; Rolls and Deco, 2010; Rolls,
2016). If the external evidence for the decision is consistent
with the decision taken (which has been influenced by the noisy
neuronal firing times), then the firing rates in the winning
attractor are supported by the external evidence, and become
especially high (Rolls and Deco, 2010; Rolls et al., 2010a,b; Rolls,
2016). If we now add a second attractor network to receive the
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firing rates from the first decision-making network, the second
attractor network can take a decision based on the confidence
expressed in the firing rates of the neurons in the first network
(Insabato et al., 2010) (Figure 2). This shows that a type of
monitoring can be performed in a simple system.
Now this is the type of description of, and language used, to
describe ‘monitoring’ functions possibly related to consciousness
(Block, 1995; Lycan, 1997; Hampton, 2001). However, we can
account for what seem like complex cognitive phenomena with
a simple system of two attractor decision-making networks
(Insabato et al., 2010; Rolls, 2016). My argument is that
some types of ‘self-monitoring’ are computationally simple, for
example in decisions made based on confidence in a first decision,
and may have little to do with consciousness; whereas HOST
processes are very different in terms of the type of syntactic
computation required, and may be more closely related to
consciousness (Rolls, 2016).
If this type of computational system that can perform syntactic
manipulations on symbols in a special type of working memory
is related to phenomenal consciousness in humans, where does
that leave the question about phenomenal consciousness in
other animals (Dawkins, 1993, 2017; Carruthers, 2019), and in
computers? First, I make it clear that our current understanding
of phenomenal consciousness is very incomplete, and current
theories should not be thought of as having implications. Second,
I note that the usual criterion for phenomenal consciousness
being present is a verbal report that it is (or a response made
after verbal description that the response is to be made when
the participant is phenomenally conscious). It is difficult to apply
that criterion to non-human animals. In those circumstances,
how might we investigate whether at least some animals have
something like phenomenal consciousness? The clearest way
I suggest would be to better understand exactly what neural
computation is being performed in humans when they report
being phenomenally conscious, and how that computation is
implemented in the brain. Then if something similar is found
in some animals, an inference would be that the computation
has the same properties, including what it feels like. Indeed,
as a functionalist, I believe that if the same computation could
be implemented in a computer as that which is related to
FIGURE 2 | Network architecture for decisions about confidence estimates. The first network is a decision-making network, and its outputs are sent to a second
network that makes decisions based on the firing rates from the first network, which reflect the decision confidence. In the first network, high firing of neuronal
population (or pool) DA represents decision A, and high firing of population DB represents decision B. Pools DA and DB receive a stimulus-related input (respectively
λA and λB), the evidence for each of the decisions, and these bias the attractor networks, which have internal positive feedback produced by the recurrent excitatory
connections (RC). Pools DA and DB compete through inhibitory interneurons. The neurons are integrate-and-fire spiking neurons with random spiking times (for a
given mean firing rate) which introduce noise into the network and influence the decision-making, making it probabilistic. The neurons in the winning population of
the first network have a higher firing rate for confident decisions in which the difference between the decision variables is large (Rolls et al., 2010a; Rolls, 2016). The
second network is a confidence decision attractor network, and receives inputs from the first network. The confidence decision network has two selective pools of
neurons, one of which (C) responds to represent confidence in the decision, and the other of which responds when there is little or a lack of confidence in the
decision (LC). The C neurons receive the outputs from the selective pools of the (first) decision-making network, and the LC neurons receive λReference which is from
the same source but saturates at 40 spikes/s, a rate that is close to the rates averaged across correct and error trials of the sum of the firing in the selective pools in
the (first) decision-making network. The second attractor network allows decisions to be made about whether to change the decision made by the first network, and
for example abort the trial or strategy. The second network, the confidence decision network, is in effect monitoring the decisions taken by the first network, and can
cause a change of strategy or behavior if the assessment of the decision taken by the first network does not seem a confident decision. From Insabato et al. (2010).
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phenomenal consciousness in humans, then the computer would
report feeling phenomenally conscious.
CONCLUSION
Problems have been raised with the global workspace hypotheses
of consciousness, for example about exactly how global the
workspace needs to be for consciousness to suddenly be present,
and that the hypothesis deals mainly with access consciousness
(Dehaene, 2014). Problems have also been raised with a
version (Carruthers, 2019) that excludes conceptual (categorical
or discrete) representations, and in which phenomenal
consciousness can be reduced to physical processes. Instead, I
advocate a levels of explanation approach to the relation between
the brain and the mind.
A different theory of phenomenal consciousness is described,
in which there is a particular computational system involved in
which HOSTs are used to perform credit assignment on first order
thoughts of multiple step plans, to correct them by manipulating
symbols in a syntactic type of working memory. This provides
a good reason for the evolution of this kind of computational
module, with which, it is proposed, phenomenal consciousness
is associated. Some advantages of this HOST approach to
phenomenal consciousness are then described with reference not
only to the global workspace approach, but also to HOT theories.
It is hypothesized that the HOST system which requires the
ability to manipulate first order symbols in working memory
might utilize parts of the prefrontal cortex implicated in working
memory, and especially the left inferior frontal gyrus, which is
involved in language and probably syntactical processing.
It appears that those involved in current global workspace
theories may not be so distant from this perspective. At least
Dehaene (2014) states that reasoning may involve consciousness:
“rationally thinking about a problem.” That is starting to become
close to HOST theory, in that at least Dehaene has in mind
something to do with serial thinking of the type that might be
implemented by a system capable of syntax, which might be a
set of first order thoughts attempting to solve a problem. So first
order thoughts of this syntactic type, supplemented I suggest by
HOSTs useful to correct the first order thoughts, may be an area
in which there may be convergence in future when thinking about
phenomenal consciousness.
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Sections “Multiple Routes to Action,” “A Computational
Hypothesis of Phenomenal Consciousness,” “Adaptive Value of
the Computational Processing That Is Related to Phenomenal
Consciousness,” “Symbol Grounding,” and “Qualia: Phenomenal
Aspects of Consciousness” update and summarize my HOST
theory of consciousness (Rolls, 1997b, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012b,
2016, 2018), because my HOST theory is relevant to the
points made in this paper. For that reason some of the text
of Sections “Multiple Routes to Action,” “A Computational
Hypothesis of Phenomenal Consciousness,” “Adaptive Value of
the Computational Processing That Is Related to Phenomenal
Consciousness,” “Symbol Grounding,” and “Qualia: Phenomenal
Aspects of Consciousness” was taken from Rolls (1997b)
Consciousness in Neural Networks? Neural Networks 10: 1227–
1240, with permission from Elsevier, where an early version of my
HOST theory was published.
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